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Alienage as a Suspect Class: Nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause 
Ariel Subourne 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America has traditionally been a country of opportunity for many 
legal immigrants.  But the process of establishing themselves in their new home has never been 
easy on immigrants, who have historically faced legal discrimination, including laws aimed at 
preventing them from working.  In Takashi v. Fish and Game Commission, the Supreme Court 
noted that “[t]he assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a 
livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right 
to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot 
work.”1  Yet today, a group of legal immigrants are facing precisely this dilemma in parts of the 
United States.  Nonimmigrants, a class of legal aliens who reside in the United States under 
temporary visas,
2
 have recently brought a series of challenges to laws that discriminated against 
them on basis of their legal status.
3
  Decades after the Supreme Court ruled in Takashi, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals invoked this case when it concluded that the State of New York 
could not prevent immigrants with temporary work visas from becoming licensed pharmacists in 
the state.
4
  This ruling was the first in a series of steps needed by the court system to prevent 
state discrimination against nonimmigrants.  The courts should evaluate discriminatory state laws 
under the Equal Protection Clause using strict scrutiny review, both because nonimmigrants are a 
                                                 
1
 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (the Supreme Court struck down a law preventing people of Japanese descent, who were 
at the time ineligible for citizenship because of their race, from receiving fishing licenses). 
2
 RICHARD D. STEEL: STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW, §2.23 (2d ed. 2012). 
3
 See infra Part III.B.  
4
 Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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suspect class and because the Supreme Court has previously ruled that classifications based on 
alienage are reviewed using strict scrutiny.  
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson confronted the 
question of whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states 
from discriminating between residents on the basis of alien status.
5
  In doing so, the Supreme 
Court had to determine whether it would review the laws under rational basis review, a standard 
that is very deferential to the government, or strict scrutiny, the highest level of equal protection 
review.
6
  The Court held that “classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality 
or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”7  After Graham, it appeared 
that the debate over whether the Equal Protection clause prohibited alienage-based 
discrimination might have been resolved.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has considered the 
difference between the rights afforded to undocumented immigrants versus legal immigrants 
several times.  But the Court has yet to address what safeguards the Equal Protection Clause 
affords to nonimmigrants. 
A question has arisen as to whether Graham’s analysis truly applies to alienage as a class, 
or if the Supreme Court merely afforded strict scrutiny review to a specific subset of legal 
immigrants, legal permanent residents, and not to nonimmigrants.
8
  Three of the Circuit Courts 
of Appeal have addressed this issue within the last ten years.  Both the Fifth and the Sixth 
Circuits have concluded that rational basis review applies to laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants.
9
  These two Circuit Courts have found that Graham’s holding only applies to 
                                                 
5
 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971). 
6
 See infra Part II.A.  
7
 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
8
 See infra Part III.A.1. 
9
 See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011); League 
of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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legal permanent residents and not to nonimmigrants.
10
  The Second Circuit in Dandamudi 
disagreed, finding that Graham’s holding applied to nonimmigrants as well.11  The Second 
Circuit thus split from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as to the appropriate level of review of such 
claims under the Equal Protection Clause.
12
  As a result, the legitimacy of laws that discriminate 
against nonimmigrants varies depending on the part of the country the nonimmigrant resides in.  
This legal discrepancy could cause serious problems for nonimmigrants in the United States.  
 This Comment addresses this present circuit split and argues that courts should review 
laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants using strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  Nonimmigrants are a suspect class, which 
has historically warranted the application of a strict scrutiny standard of review.  In addition, the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Graham was meant to establish strict scrutiny as the appropriate 
standard of review for alienage as a whole.  For these reasons, strict scrutiny is the appropriate 
level of review.  Part II of this Comment contains a brief overview of immigration law and how 
it categorizes different classes of immigrants, as well as a brief discussion of the standards of 
review under the Equal Protection Clause.  Part III contains an analysis of the Supreme Court 
case law on immigration and equal protection challenges, and a discussion of the current federal 
appellate and district court cases covering challenges to laws that restrict the rights and privileges 
of nonimmigrants.  Part IV then discusses a variety of approaches to preventing legal 
discrimination against nonimmigrants and the consequences of each suggested approach.  Part V 
concludes that courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants under the strict 
scrutiny standard of review.  
II. BACKGROUND 
                                                 
10
 Id. 
11
 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 81.  
12
 Id. at 78–79. 
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A. The Equal Protection Clause and Levels of Review 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that “no state shall. . 
. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13  Historically, the 
Supreme Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to state laws that discriminated against 
different groups in an uneven manner.
14
  The Court later developed a more specific method of 
deciding Equal Protection cases beginning with United States v. Carolene Products.
15
  In 
footnote four, the Supreme Court noted that it might apply “more exacting judicial scrutiny” to 
laws depending on, among other things, whether the law discriminated between “particular 
religious. . . or national. . . or racial minorities. . .” or “discrete and insular minorities. . . .”16  The 
Supreme Court later adopted the idea that it was appropriate to apply different levels of scrutiny 
to laws depending on what groups they were distinguishing between.
17
  The Supreme Court 
eventually developed three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate or heightened scrutiny, 
and rational basis.
18
   
Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of Equal Protection review.  To pass, the 
proponent of the law must show that they are pursuing a compelling government interest and that 
the law is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve this interest.
19
  The courts will apply strict 
scrutiny review to classifications based on race or national origin.
20
  The Supreme Court has also 
applied strict scrutiny review to classifications based on alienage,
21
  though whether 
classifications based on alienage always trigger strict scrutiny review is, of course, the subject of 
                                                 
13
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
14
 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW–SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, § 
18.3(a)(i) (5th ed. 2012). 
15
 See 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  
16
 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
17
 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(v).  
18
 Id.  
19
 Id. at § 12.3(a)(iii).  
20
 Id. 
21
 See Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); infra Part III.A.1. 
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some debate.
22
  Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny and is the default applied by the 
courts in absence of a reason for a heightened level of scrutiny.
23
  The courts evaluate only 
whether the classification has a rational relationship to some legitimate end that the government 
is pursuing.
24
  While the specific formulation varies, intermediate scrutiny generally requires a 
court to evaluate whether there is an important government objective that is substantially related 
to the government action at issue.
25
  The Supreme Court has also applied an intermediate level in 
some cases, such as those discriminating on the basis of gender.
26
  In some particular 
circumstances, the Supreme Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny to undocumented 
immigrants.
27
  
The appropriate level of classification is determined by evaluating whether the group in 
question is a “suspect class” for the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.28  Whether a class is 
suspect can depend on a variety of factors, such as if the class is a “discrete and insular minority. 
. .”29  or has been “subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to 
such a position of political powerlessness. . . .”30  If a court finds that the group in question is a 
suspect class, it will apply strict scrutiny review.
31
  If the group has some of the characteristics of 
a suspect class, a court may choose to apply a heightened form of scrutiny.
32
  But if the class is 
not suspect, it is unlikely that a court will apply anything other than rational basis scrutiny.
33
  
Courts generally give a strong presumption of constitutionality to laws reviewed under rational 
                                                 
22
 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
23
 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(ii). 
24
 Id.  
25
 Id. at § 18.3(a)(iv).  
26
 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).  
27
 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see infra Part III.A.2. 
28
 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(iii).  
29
 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
30
 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).  
31
 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 14, at § 18.3(a)(iii). 
32
 Id. at § 18.3(a)(iv). 
33
 Id. at § 18.3(a)(ii). 
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basis.
34
  Therefore, heightened levels of scrutiny are far more advantageous to plaintiffs 
challenging these classifications.  
B. The Classification of Aliens Under United States Law 
Immigration law in the United States divides aliens into three major categories: legal 
permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and undocumented immigrants.
35
  The first category 
contains legal permanent residents (herein “LPRs”).36  Also referred to simply as immigrants, 
LPRs have the intention to stay in the United States permanently.
37
  LPRs obtain legal permits, 
often referred to as green cards, that allow them to remain in the United States permanently.
38
  
LPRs can achieve permanent resident status through a variety of means, though the most 
common include “through family relationships, through a job, or as a refugee or asylee.”39  The 
second category of aliens is undocumented immigrants or “illegal aliens”. Undocumented 
immigrants generally have less legal rights due to their illegal status.
40
   
The final category of immigrants is nonimmigrants, who are temporary, legal aliens.
41
  
Nonimmigrants come to the United States temporarily “to engage in an activity encompassed 
within one of the nonimmigrant classifications set forth in the [Immigration and Nationality 
Act].” 42  Nonimmigrants are required to establish “eligibility within one of the principal 
nonimmigrant classifications or one of the subclassifications” in order to qualify for a visa.43  
The category covers a variety of individuals, such as “temporary workers, students, foreign 
                                                 
34
 Id. at § 18.3(a)(v). 
35
 STEEL, supra note 2, at §2.23. 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id.  
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at § 2.24. 
40
 Plyler, 457 U.S. at  222. 
41
 STEEL, at  §2.23. 
42
 Id. at §3.1. 
43
 Id. at §2.28. 
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diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.”44  The INA only permits nonimmigrants to remain in 
the United States for a finite period, though that period varies depending on the type of 
nonimmigrant visa.
45
  
 This Comment focuses on nonimmigrants, and specifically those that are in the United 
States for a longer period of time, such as those with work or student visas.  There are several 
types of student visas; nonimmigrants can attend a college program with an F–1 visa, while 
Mexican and Canadian students can receive an F–3 visa for a similar purpose.46  The 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) also provides for a variety of temporary work visas, such 
as H–1B and H–1C visas.47  Additionally, “TN” immigrants are a class of nonimmigrants created 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
48
  Workers with H–1B, H–1C, and 
TN visas typically stay in the United States for an initial period of three years, and can later 
receive a three–year extension of the initial period.49  Thus, the work period is technically 
restricted to six years.
50
  But many nonimmigrants remain in the country for longer, as “federal 
law permits many aliens with TN or H1–B status to maintain their temporary worker 
authorization for a period greater than six years.”51  Generally, nonimmigrants enter the United 
States on a temporary basis and must attest that they do not intend to remain in the United States 
past the time allowed by their visa
52
  
                                                 
44
 Justin Storch, Legal Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed Professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12, 13 
(2011). 
45
 STEEL, supra note 2, at § 3.12. 
46
 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(F) (2012); 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2012); 
see also STEEL, supra note 2, at § 3.12. 
47
 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2010). 
48
 8 C.F.R. § 214.6. 
49
 Dandamudi, 686  F.3d at 70.  
50
 Id. at 71. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Storch, supra note 44, at 13. 
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This Comment focuses on nonimmigrants with work visas because they are some of the 
longer-staying nonimmigrant classes.  As a result, discriminatory laws disproportionately affect 
them as a group.  Additionally, the limited case law on nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection 
Clause usually involves challenges brought by nonimmigrants with work and student visas, 
because these laws discriminated against those particular nonimmigrants.
53
  While the analysis of 
this Comment focuses on nonimmigrants with work visas, the conclusions are applicable to the 
whole category.  Nonimmigrants in general are in a legally vulnerable position because their 
status under the Constitution is unclear.
54
  Therefore, the conclusions drawn in this Comment are 
applicable to the whole class.  
III. IMMIGRATION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
A. Alienage Before the Supreme Court 
1. Early Rulings on Alienage 
The Supreme Court initially determined the level of Equal Protection review afforded to 
aliens in Graham v. Richardson.  In Graham, the Court examined Arizona and Pennsylvania 
state laws that restricted welfare benefits to citizens or long–term residents.55  The Court referred 
to the plaintiffs, who all had some form of LPR status, as “lawfully admitted residents.”56  
Arizona and Pennsylvania argued that the Constitution permitted states to “favor United States 
citizens over aliens” and that doing so did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.57  The 
plaintiffs argued that preventing aliens from accessing welfare benefits on an equal basis as their 
                                                 
53
 See infra Part III.B.  
54
 See infra Part III.A. 
55
 Graham, 403 U.S. at 367.  
56
 Id. at 367–70.  
57
 Id. at 371.  
9 
 
citizen counterparts was unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
58
  
The Court stated that the restrictive welfare laws “create two classes of needy persons, 
indistinguishable except with respect to whether they are or are not citizens of this country.”59   
Invoking United States v. Carolene Product Co.’s famous footnote four, the Court found that 
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority. . . for whom. . . 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”60  As such, the Court concluded that their decisions 
had “established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are 
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”61  The Court stated that while it had 
occasionally upheld statutes that distinguished between citizens and immigrants, those 
distinctions had been necessary to protect specific “special interests of the State or its citizens.”62  
Under the circumstances presented in the case, the Court held that the “State's desire to preserve 
limited welfare benefits for its own citizens” was not a special interest sufficient to justify the 
state’s discrimination against the plaintiffs.63  
The Supreme Court focused on LPRs in its analysis. The Court referred variously to 
“resident” aliens and “lawful” aliens throughout the opinion.64  The Supreme Court also relied on 
the similarities between LPRs and citizens to support its conclusions.
65
  It held that “[a]liens like 
citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces” and that “[u]nlike the short–term 
residents. . . aliens may live within a state for many years, work in the state and contribute to the 
                                                 
58
 Id. at 368–69.  
59
 Id. at 368–369. 
60
 Id.  
61
 Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–372. 
62
 Id at 372. 
63
 Id at 374.  
64
 Id. at 367–70.  
65
 Id. at 376. 
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economic growth of the state.”66  The Court distinguished “short–term” residents from 
permanent aliens, who share more in common with citizens.
67
  The Supreme Court also stated 
that states cannot argue that citizens have a special interest in tax revenue spent on citizens 
themselves when “aliens have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State.”68  
By specifically framing the issue around the characteristics of LPRs, the Court may have been 
limiting its holding to that specific group of aliens.
69
  As such, the holding would exclude 
nonimmigrants and laws discriminating against them would only be subject to rational basis 
review.
70
  Many courts and scholars have concluded the Supreme Court intended its holding in 
Graham to apply to alienage in general, thus applying a strict scrutiny standard of review to 
classifications affecting all classes of legal immigrants.
71
  Others have argued that the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Graham applied only to LPRs and not to nonimmigrants.72  These differing 
interpretations of Graham are the basis of the current circuit split over the level of Equal 
Protection review granted to nonimmigrants. 
Following Graham, the Court addressed a variety of other Equal Protection challenges to 
state laws that discriminated on the basis of alienage.  For example, in In re Griffiths, the Court 
considered a challenge to a state law limited admission to the Connecticut bar to citizens.
73
  
                                                 
66
 Id. 
67
 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376.  
68
 Id. 
69
 See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011); 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, (6th Cir. 2007).  
70
 See supra notes 23–24.  
71
 See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012); Kirk v. New York State Dep. Of Educ., 562 F.Supp.2d 
(W.D.N.Y. 2008); Adam Bryan Wall, Justice For All? The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal 
Application To Illegal Aliens, 84 TUL, L. REV. 759 (2010). 
72
 See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. Martin. 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011); 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, (6th Cir. 2007); Adam Bryan Wall, Justice 
For All? The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal Application To Illegal Aliens, 84 TUL, L. REV. 759 
(2010). 
73
 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973). 
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Griffiths, like Graham, involved an alien that had LPR status.
74
  In concluding that the 
Connecticut law violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Griffiths Court affirmed that 
“[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently 
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”75  As in Graham, the Court also emphasized the 
similarities between LPRs and citizens to support its holding.
76
  The Griffiths Court stated that 
“[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and 
contribute in myriad other ways to our society. . .” and therefore the state “bear[s] a heavy 
burden when it deprives them of employment opportunities.”77  The Supreme Court cited these 
same factors to support the decision in Graham.
78
  These subsequent decisions had reinforced the 
view that the Supreme Court, in focusing on the characteristics of LPRs, intended to limit its 
holding to LPRs alone.  
2. Undocumented Immigrants  
Undocumented immigrants have also challenged laws under the Equal Protection clause, 
with varying degrees of success.  The Supreme Court ruled on such a claim in Plyler v. Doe, a 
case examining the legality of a school admission policy that restricted the registration of 
children of undocumented immigrants.
79
  In Plyler, the Court initially dismissed the idea that 
undocumented aliens were a suspect class.
80
  Specifically, the Court held that an individual’s 
undocumented status did not permit the same level of constitutional protections afforded to legal 
                                                 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. at 721. 
76
 Id. at 722. 
77
 Id.  
78
 See supra notes 65–68. 
79
 457 U.S. at 204. 
80
 Id. at 223.   
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aliens.
81
  Therefore, it seemed that the Plyler Court had decided to apply rational basis review in 
the case.
82
  
But the Plyler majority went on to emphasize that the class at issue in the case was the 
children of undocumented immigrants, not just undocumented immigrants in general.
83
  The 
Court stated that the law at issue “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not 
accountable for their disabling status.”84  The Court therefore required the state to point to a 
“substantial goal” furthered by the law.85  While the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it 
would use rational basis review, the “substantial goal” language implied that the Court was 
actually applying some form of heightened scrutiny.
86
  Ultimately, the Court struck down the 
restrictions on undocumented immigrant children under this heightened standard.
87
  
Plyler complicated the analysis of how the Equal Protection Clause is used to review 
laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage by potentially introducing a third level of scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court stated in Plyler that it was applying rational basis review to the case.
88
   But 
Plyler’s holding seemed to actually apply a form of heightened review to undocumented 
immigrants as a class.
89
  As a result, the courts now have three levels of scrutiny that could 
potentially apply to aliens.  The Plyler Court emphasized the fact that the undocumented 
immigrants at issue were children who were in a particularly vulnerable position through no fault 
of their own.
90
  This focus on the vulnerability of children implies that intermediate scrutiny 
                                                 
81
 Id.  
82
 Id.  
83
 Id. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. at 230. 
88
 Id. at 222. 
89
 Id. at 223 
90
 Id.  
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would not usually apply to aliens.  Therefore, the actual holding of Plyler may be narrower than 
it first appears.   
3. Nonimmigrants  
The Supreme Court has almost never dealt considered the constitutionality of laws that 
discriminated against nonimmigrants.  Toll v. Moreno is the sole case decided by the Supreme 
Court that contained an Equal Protection challenge to a law that discriminated against 
nonimmigrants.
91
  Toll involved the University of Maryland’s decision granted preferential 
tuition to students with a domicile in Maryland.
92
  Only citizens or LPRs with domicile, 
however, could receive these benefits.
93
  The University policy exempted nonimmigrants from 
these benefits, even if the particular type of visa the nonimmigrant held allowed them to establish 
domicile in the state.
94
  Nonimmigrant students challenged the law, arguing that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated against nonimmigrants as a class in favor of 
citizens and LPRs.
95
  The plaintiffs argued in the alternative that federal immigration law 
preempted state law, which designated that nonimmigrants with G–4 visas could establish 
domiciles.
96
 
Rather than deciding the case on the Equal Protection argument, the Supreme Court 
struck down the law on preemption grounds.
97
  After ruling on preemption grounds, the Court 
held that it “[had] no occasion to consider whether the policy violates the. . .  Equal Protection 
                                                 
91
 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3 (1982). 
92
 Id. at 3–4.  
93
 Id.  
94
 Id. at 3.  
95
 Id. at 4.  
96
 Id. at 3.  
97
 Toll, 458 U.S. at 10–17 (The Court held that Congress has expressly permitted the classes of nonimmigrants in 
question here to “establish domicile.”  Maryland was not permitted to remove this domicile status, as the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution made federal law preempt state law.  The Court “note[d] the substantial limitations upon 
the authority of the States in making classifications based upon alienage” in deciding Toll.).  
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Clause.”98  The holding itself was very narrow, dealing only with a very small subset of 
nonimmigrants that were explicitly granted domicile status. 
99
  The Court did not even consider 
the Equal Protection arguments presented in Toll.
100
  The Court seemed to avoid any discussion 
of the issue, beyond recounting the District Court’s ruling.101  As such, it remained an open 
question as to whether the Graham analysis should apply to nonimmigrants.  
B. Circuit Courts, Nonimmigrants, and the Equal Protection Clause 
The federal circuits have only occasionally addressed challenges to laws discriminating 
against nonimmigrants.  Most of these cases arose within the last twenty years and are 
concentrated within three circuits: the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Second.  The Fifth and Sixth 
Circuit Courts have held that courts should consider laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants under rational basis review.  The Second Circuit has very recently disagreed with 
its fellow Circuit Courts, holding that strict scrutiny review is appropriate for reviewing laws that 
restrict the employment of nonimmigrants.  Accordingly, there is a current split amongst the 
circuits as to the appropriate level of scrutiny for Equal Protection challenges to laws that 
exclude nonimmigrants.  
1. The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation 
The Fifth Circuit was in the position of being the first Circuit Court to determine what 
level of scrutiny nonimmigrants should receive under the Equal Protection Clause in LeClerc v. 
Webb.  LeClerc addressed an equal protection challenge to a law restricting state bar exam 
admissions.
102
  Louisiana law only permitted only citizens or LPRs to apply to the bar.
103
  The 
                                                 
98
 Toll, 458 U.S. at 10. 
99
 Id. at 17 
100
 Id. at 10.  
101
 Id.  
102
 419 F.3d at  410. 
103
 Id.  
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class of plaintiffs, from two consolidated cases, held several different types of nonimmigrant 
visas, including J–1 student visas and H–1B work visas.104  Several of the plaintiffs had entered 
the United States under one of these types of visas but had then transitioned to others.
105
  The 
plaintiffs maintained that the law violated their Equal Protection rights by distinguishing their 
legal treatment from that of LPRs and citizens.
106
  The plaintiffs argued that the law should either 
be evaluated under strict scrutiny analysis because “under In re Griffiths, nonimmigrant aliens 
are a suspect class and state laws affecting them are subject to strict scrutiny”, or that it should be 
evaluated under intermediate scrutiny because “nonimmigrant aliens are a quasi–suspect 
class.”107  The Fifth Circuit dismissed these arguments and eventually ruled that rational basis 
was the appropriate level of review.
108
 
As a threshold matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that In re Griffiths
109
 was not 
applicable because it addressed discrimination against an LPR alien, and not whether strict 
scrutiny review applied to nonimmigrants.
110
  The Fifth Circuit held that the differences between 
nonimmigrants and LPRs were “paramount[.]”111  The court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Griffiths turned on the fact that “resident aliens share essential benefits and burdens 
of citizenship . . . in a way that aliens with lesser legal status do not.”112  The Fifth Circuit found 
that Griffiths forbade the “total exclusion” of aliens in general, but did not forbid the exclusion of 
some classes of aliens.
113
  
                                                 
104
 Id. at 410–11; see supra Part II.A. 
105
 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 410–411.  
106
 Id.  at 414–15.  
107
 Id. at 415 
108
 Id.  
109
 Which, as previously discussed, held that the state of Connecticut could not prevent LPRs from sitting for the bar 
solely because of their alien status. See supra notes 73–78.  
110
 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 415. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id.  
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The Fifth Circuit then considered two additional arguments: that nonimmigrants 
constituted a suspect class for the purposes of Equal Protection analysis, or that laws restricting 
nonimmigrants in general should receive strict scrutiny as a default.
114
  The Fifth Circuit held 
that though alienage classifications are “subject to close judicial scrutiny as a general matter[,]” 
and all such classifications are not inherently invalid or suspect.
115
  The court pointed out that 
after Graham, non–LPR aliens had received only rational basis review or, in the rare case of 
Plyler, heightened review.
116
  The Fifth Circuit also held that the plaintiffs in Plyler only 
received heightened review because they were children and as such the case represented an 
outlier.
117
 
The court reasoned that the distinct traits of LPR status meant that such aliens were 
entitled to more searching judicial scrutiny, while nonimmigrants, lacking these traits, were 
not.
118
  Specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has emphasized two 
conditions of LPRs that justified the application of strict scrutiny to laws that affected them: “ (1) 
the inability of resident aliens to exert political power in their own interest given their status as 
virtual citizens; and (2) the similarity of resident aliens and citizens.”119  In contrast, 
nonimmigrants, “who ordinarily stipulate. . . that they have no intention of abandoning their 
native citizenship” did not merit “the extraordinary protection” that strict scrutiny review 
provided. 
120
  The Fifth Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis on nonimmigrants’ “temporary 
connection” to the United States.121  The court concluded that “[a]lthough aliens are a suspect 
class in general, they are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the proposition that 
                                                 
114
 Id.  
115
 Id. at 415–416. 
116
 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 416. 
117
 Id.  
118
 Id. at 417. 
119
 Id. 
120
 Id. at 418–19. 
121
 Id. 
17 
 
nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class. . . .”122  The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the 
Supreme Court did not intend for nonimmigrants to receive a higher level of scrutiny and 
“decline[d] to extend the Supreme Court's decisions concerning resident aliens to different alien 
categories when the Court itself has shied away from such expansion.”123  The Court reviewed 
the state bar exam restrictions under rational basis review and ultimately upheld them.
124
  
The majority of the Fifth Circuit upheld the regulations on all grounds.
125
  But in the 
LeClerc dissent,  Judge Stewart disagreed with the majority’s decision to apply rational basis 
review.
126
  Judge Stewart differed with the majority’s interpretation of Graham, noting that “the 
Supreme Court's statement that ‘alienage is a suspect class’ by definition includes nonimmigrant 
aliens as part of that class.”127  Judge Stewart maintained that the Supreme Court did not restrict 
its ruling in Graham to LPRs, even though the Court used language referring to resident 
aliens.
128
  Judge Stewart stated that “the Supreme Court has referred to resident aliens, aliens and 
non–citizens interchangeably” and “residence and immigration status should be understood as 
two separate distinctions; one does not necessarily have to do with the other.”129  According to 
the judge, the Graham Court held that alienage in general was a suspect class.
130
  
Judge Stewart also disagreed with the way the majority distinguished nonimmigrants as a 
distinct class from LPRs.  He argued that the distinction between the two classes was not great 
enough to warrant different treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.
131
  Instead, he argued 
there were enough similarities between LPRs and nonimmigrants in important areas (such as the 
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inability to vote and a history of discrimination) to warrant nonimmigrants’ inclusion as a 
suspect class.
132
  Judge Stewart also dismissed the alleged “transience” of nonimmigrant aliens, 
noting that “not all nonimmigrant aliens are required to keep a permanent residence abroad [,]” 
nor were they forbidden from intending to stay in the United States.
133
  The judge pointed to the 
State Department’s acceptance of the doctrine of dual intent, which permitted nonimmigrant 
aliens to “express a short term intent to remain in the United States temporarily (so as to not 
contravene the requirements of the visa under which they entered)” as well as “a long term intent 
to remain in the United States permanently (so that they may apply for adjustment of status).”134  
The acceptance of dual intent showed that even the government acknowledged that 
nonimmigrants were not, as a group, transient.
135
  Judge Stewart concluded that “[t]he 
presumption should be that nonimmigrant aliens are part of the alien suspect class and the 
defendants should have the burden of proving the opposite.” 136 
Six years after LeClerc, the scope of Equal Protection rights for nonimmigrants was again 
before the Fifth Circuit in Van Staden v. St. Martin.
137
  Van Staden addressed the 
constitutionality of licensing restriction for nurses in Louisiana.
138
  Van Staden, a nurse 
authorized to work in the United States who was in the process of applying for LPR status, 
challenged a law allowing only LPRs and citizens to apply for nursing licenses.
139
  At the outset, 
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the case was “controlled by LeClerc.”140  The Fifth Circuit held 
that “[n]onimmigrant aliens satisfy neither of the conditions triggering strict scrutiny. . .” because 
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nonimmigrants were neither discrete nor insular, had varied admission statuses, and lacked 
political capacity only due to their temporary status.
141
  Additionally, the Fifth Circuit further 
concluded that applicants for LPR status should count as nonimmigrants for the purposes of 
Equal Protection challenges, and should not receive the same treatment as full-fledged a LPR.
142
  
The Fifth Circuit thus applied rational basis review to the law, and ultimately upheld the 
restrictions.
143
  
2. The Sixth Circuit Follows the Fifth 
In the Sixth Circuit, the scope of Equal Protection rights for nonimmigrants arose in 
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen.
144
  In LULAC, the Sixth Circuit 
agreed with the Fifth Circuit in holding that that state restrictions on nonimmigrants were not 
subject to strict scrutiny review.
145
  Unlike the Fifth Circuit cases, which addressed laws 
restricting employment, LULAC considered a law preventing nonimmigrants from receiving 
driver’s licenses.146  LULAC, a non–profit organization concerned with Hispanic rights, sued on 
behalf of its members, in addition to several individuals who could not obtain driver’s licenses 
due to their nonimmigrant status.
147
  The plaintiffs alleged that the law discriminated against 
them based on their nonimmigrant status, and that that discrimination violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.
148
  
Relying heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and quoting LeClerc frequently in its 
analysis, the Sixth Circuit agreed that nonimmigrants were a dissimilar class from LPRs.
149
  The 
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LULAC majority found that “there are abundant good reasons, both legal and pragmatic, why 
lawful permanent residents are the only subclass of aliens who have been treated as a suspect 
class.”150  The court reasoned that the case at hand did not provide any “compelling reason” to 
extend “the special protection afforded by suspect–class recognition” to nonimmigrants.151  The 
Sixth Circuit concluded that as “the instant classification does not result in discriminatory harm 
to members of a suspect class[,]” rational basis was the appropriate standard to apply152  
In a counterpoint to the LULAC opinion, Judge Gilman argued in his dissent that strict 
scrutiny review was the proper standard of Equal Protection review for laws that discriminated 
against nonimmigrants.
153
  The judge fundamentally disagreed with the majority opinions in both 
LULAC and LeClerc as to the Supreme Court’s intention that Graham’s holding applied to 
nonimmigrants.
154
  While acknowledging that the Supreme Court had “never specifically held 
that temporary resident legal aliens, as a subset of all aliens, are a suspect class for equal–
protection purposes. . .” Judge Gilman deemed such silence irrelevant.155   He noted that the 
Graham majority had not restricted its analysis to LPRs exclusively, but had instead applied its 
reasoning to alienage classifications generally.
156
  
Judge Gilman furthered criticized the majority’s reliance on LeClerc, noting that it had 
adopted the LeClerc opinion “without even mentioning the numerous criticisms to which that 
analysis has been subject.”157  In invoking Judge Stewart’s dissent in LeClerc, Judge Gilman 
stated that the majority had failed address both that dissent and the other criticisms that the 
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majority opinion had been subject to.
158
  In the end, Judge Gilman concluded that extending 
strict scrutiny review to nonimmigrants would not be expanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Graham, as the Court had intended it.
159
   
3. The Second Circuit’s Disagreement 
Prior to the summer of 2012, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal were in limited 
agreement that courts should review laws that discriminated against nonimmigrants under 
rational basis review.  But the Second Circuit departed the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in ruling in 
the case Dandamudi v. Tisch that such laws should instead be subject to strict scrutiny review.   
Even prior to Dandamudi, the Second Circuit seemed receptive to the idea that strict 
scrutiny should apply to nonimmigrant Equal Protection claims.  In 2008, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of New York in Kirk v. New York State Department of 
Education considered whether a law restricting veterinarian licenses to citizens and LPRs 
violated the equal protection rights of an alien with a TN temporary work visa.
160
  The District 
Court considered the Fifth and Sixth Circuit majority opinions as well as the dissents.
161
  It 
proceeded to reject the theory that the Supreme Court had limited its holding in Graham to 
LPRs.
162
  It concluded that “the challenged statute must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny 
standard…” and that the law “fail[ed] to pass such scrutiny.”163  The Second Circuit never had 
the opportunity to review the decision in Kirk, however, as the plaintiff received LPR status 
shortly after the prevailing before the district court.
164
  One year later, the Second Circuit had 
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another chance to address the scope of nonimmigrants’ equal protections right in the case of 
Dandamudi v. Tisch. 
Dandamudi addressed the constitutionality of a New York law that prevented 
nonimmigrants from obtaining pharmacists licenses.
165
  The New York law required pharmacists 
to either be citizens of the United States or be legal permanent residents.
166
  The New York law 
had provided an exception allowing nonimmigrants to work as pharmacists, but it expired in 
2006 and the legislature did not renew it.
167
  As a result, a number of nonimmigrants licensed as 
pharmacists in New York brought suit, arguing that the licensing restrictions violated their Equal 
Protection rights under the Constitution.
168
   
There were two types of nonimmigrant work visas at issue in Dandamudi: H1–B visas, 
which fell under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and TN visas, which fell under the 
NAFTA.
169
  These visas permitted the workers to stay in the United States for six years under the 
initial visa and the extension.
170
  Federal law permitted them to stay longer and as a result “[a]ll 
plaintiffs in this case… ha[d] been legally authorized to reside and work in the United States for 
more than six years.”171  Additionally, twenty–two of the plaintiffs had applied for LPR status at 
the time the court decided Dandamudi.
172
 
The Second Circuit began by stating that “[t]here is no question that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to all aliens.”173  It then proceeded to discuss Graham, concluding that while 
the Supreme Court never explicitly applied strict scrutiny to nonimmigrant aliens, “the Court has 
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never held that lawfully admitted aliens are outside of Graham's protection.”174  Indeed, the court 
observed that “the [Supreme] Court has never distinguished between classes of legal resident 
aliens.”175  The Second Circuit therefore rejected the argument that Graham’s analysis did not 
apply to nonimmigrants.
176
  
The Second Circuit also addressed the Fifth Circuits position in LeClerc and Van Staden 
and Sixth Circuits’ position in LULAC.177  The court proceeded to reject these positions for three 
reasons.  Initially, the court rejected the notion that the Supreme Court's discussion of “the 
similarities between citizens and aliens” in Graham had articulated “a test for determining when 
state discrimination against any one subclass of lawful immigrants is subject to strict 
scrutiny.”178  According to the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court was merely supporting its 
point in listing those factors, and was not creating an exhaustive test.
179
  The court further 
reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ argument that Graham’s language limited its holding 
to LPRs “reveals the danger of separating the words of an opinion from the context in which they 
were employed.”180  In the Second Circuit’s view, the Supreme Court was merely stating that 
“LPRs and citizens have much in common [and that] treating them differently does not pass 
muster under the Fourteenth Amendment.”181  The Second Circuit went on to hold that “[t]he 
converse of this rationale, however, does not become a litmus test for determining whether a 
particular group of aliens is a suspect class”.182  
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Next, the Second Circuit reasoned that “nonimmigrant aliens are but one subclass of 
aliens, and the Supreme Court recognizes aliens generally as a discrete and insular minority 
without significant political clout.”183  The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Graham 
had not distinguished between different subclasses of aliens, but only between legal and illegal 
aliens.
184
  Graham’s language specifically spoke to alienage as a general class and not to LPRs 
only.
185
  Therefore, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Sixth’s Circuits’ narrow 
reading of Graham.
186
 
Finally, the court found that even were it to decide the appropriate level of scrutiny based 
on nonimmigrants’ similarity to citizens, it would still apply strict scrutiny “because 
nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently similar to citizens that discrimination against them in the 
context presented here must be strictly scrutinized.”187  The Second Circuit pointed to a myriad 
of characteristics common to both nonimmigrants and citizens, including that nonimmigrants pay 
taxes “often on the same terms as citizens and LPRs. . .” and that many nonimmigrants also had 
a far more permanent connection to the United States than other court had acknowledged.
188
  
Specifically, the court rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ dismissal of nonimmigrants as a 
discrete and insular minority partially due to the fact that nonimmigrants could only stay in the 
United States for six years and had to promise that they did not intend to remain permanently in 
the United States.
189
  Acknowledging that many nonimmigrants do, in fact, stay in the United 
States longer, the court pointed to the dual intent doctrine, which provided that nonimmigrants 
could express both “an intent to remain temporarily” under the their work visas and  “an intent to 
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remain permanently” by applying for LPR status.190  The Second Circuit therefore concluded that 
“[t]he aliens at issue here are ‘transient’ in name only.”191  The court reasoned that “[a] great 
number of these professionals remain in the United States for much longer than six years and 
many ultimately apply for, and obtain, permanent residence.  These practicalities are not 
irrelevant.”192  Acknowledging that the Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny to 
undocumented immigrants in Plyler, the Second Circuit also saw “no reason to create an 
exception to the Supreme Court's precedent that would result in such illogical results. . .” by 
applying a lower level of scrutiny to nonimmigrants than was applied to undocumented 
immigrants.”193  Accordingly, finding “little or no distinction between LPRs and the lawfully 
admitted nonimmigrant plaintiffs [in Dandamudi,]” the court held that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in the present case.
194
  
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Case for Strict Scrutiny 
 The Second Circuit is the first Circuit Court to hold that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires courts to review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants under a strict scrutiny 
level of review.  Even prior to Dandamudi, dissenting judges and scholars had argued that 
rational basis was not the appropriate level scrutiny for nonimmigrants.
195
  The Second Circuit’s 
ruling incorporated many of the arguments made previously by commentators, as well as by the 
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dissenters in LULAC and LeClerc.  As the subsequent discussion will show, strict scrutiny is the 
appropriate level of scrutiny for laws restricting the rights of nonimmigrants. Binding precedent 
from the Supreme Court clearly requires the application of strict scrutiny.  In addition, strict 
scrutiny review of laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants is necessary to protect a 
vulnerable class of legal aliens. 
1. The Proper Application of Graham 
Graham extended strict scrutiny review to all classes of aliens, and not only to LPRs.  It 
is true that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham did explicitly discuss LPRs and their 
characteristics, and that the opinion did not mention nonimmigrants.
196
  The Supreme Court 
stated that “short term” aliens did not share the same characteristics as citizens and LPRs, but it 
did not define what it meant by “short term.”197  The Court may have made this distinction with 
the intent to separate nonimmigrants as a whole from LPRs, or it could be distinguishing 
nonimmigrants with shorter term visas.
198
  The Supreme Court did not decide this point, but its 
opinion did not explicitly exclude nonimmigrants.  The Supreme Court did, however, state in 
Graham that laws discriminating against “alienage” as a class should be subject to strict scrutiny 
review.
199
  This language implies that the holding was broad, not restrictive.  The Supreme Court 
may have focused on LPRs in Graham purely because the plaintiffs in the case were all LPRs.   
As Judge Gilman argued in his dissent in LULAC, the Supreme Court’s silence on 
nonimmigrants in Graham “proves little.”200  While the Supreme Court may not have 
specifically discussed nonimmigrants in Graham, it did not explicitly leave them out either.  
Indeed, in using broad language about alienage, the Supreme Court may have been explicitly 
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including nonimmigrants.
201
  Had the Court wanted to limit its holding to LPRs, it could have 
explicitly stated this, rather than using general language about alienage.  The Supreme Court’s 
silence in Toll, its only case presenting an Equal Protection question on nonimmigrants, neither 
confirms nor denies that strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of review.
202
  The Supreme Court 
has only explicitly excluded undocumented immigrants from its holding in Graham, and did so 
largely due to their illegal status in the country.
203
  The Fifth and Sixth Circuits held that the list 
of similarities between citizens and LPRs in Graham shows that Graham applies only to LPRs.  
But the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that “nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently similar to 
citizens that discrimination against them…must be strictly scrutinized.”204  Thus, the Second 
Circuit showed that the Graham analysis can easily encompass nonimmigrants as well as LPRs. 
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ position, that the Supreme Court used language in Graham meant 
to exclude nonimmigrants, has no textual support.
205
  There is strong support for the proposition 
that the Supreme Court intended its holding in Graham to apply to alienage as a whole, including 
nonimmigrants.   
2. Nonimmigrants as a Suspect Class 
Even if Graham’s holding is limited to LPRs, nonimmigrants still deserve strict scrutiny 
review.  As the Second Circuit and dissenting judges in other circuits that have addressed this 
issue have suggested, nonimmigrants may be suspect class for the purposes of Equal Protection 
Clause review.
206
  As such, the courts would review laws discriminating against nonimmigrants 
under strict scrutiny review.   
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One common marker of a suspect class is the class’s inability to utilize the political 
process.
207
  As the LeClerc majority suggested, because nonimmigrants as a class are so varied, 
one cannot state that as a group they are politically unable.
208
  But the variety of nonimmigrant 
visas available is irrelevant to whether nonimmigrants as a whole are unable to access the 
political process as easily as citizens.
209
  Because of their legal status in the country, 
nonimmigrants are just as separated from the political process than LPRs, if not more so. 
210
   
Another argument against nonimmigrants as a suspect class is the lack of “permanency” 
within the class of nonimmigrants.  The Fifth Circuit tied nonimmigrants’ “temporary connection 
to this country” with their lack of legal capacity, and concluded that nonimmigrants did not 
deserve suspect class status.
211
  The Fifth Circuit held that because nonimmigrants were required 
to promise not to stay in the United States and to maintain foreign citizenship, nonimmigrants 
were transient and had no permanent ties to the United States.
212
  This is a very literal 
interpretation of immigration law as to the permanency of nonimmigrant residence.  The Second 
Circuit disagreed with this interpretation, and found that most nonimmigrants ended up staying 
legally in the United States for longer periods of time and ultimately received LPR status.
213
  The 
Second Circuit noted that one of the plaintiffs in the district court case preceding Dandamudi 
was dismissed during the appeals process because he received a green card.
214
  The previous 
Second Circuit district court case, Kirk, was also dismissed for this reason.
215
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Nonimmigrants are a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. They are 
politically impotent, facing maybe of the same problems and prejudices as the LPRs.  
Furthermore, the lack of permanency of nonimmigrants is an illusion, dispelled by the reality that 
many end up staying in the United States legally for a long period of time, ultimately receiving 
LPR status. Therefore, courts should review laws discriminating against nonimmigrants under 
strict scrutiny review.  
B.  Intermediate Scrutiny as a Viable Alternative 
Short of reviewing classifications based upon nonimmigrant status under strict scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny might appropriately apply to nonimmigrants.
216
  One could argue that if 
undocumented immigrants receive at least heightened scrutiny under Plyler, nonimmigrants 
deserve at least the same standard of review.
217
  Although the Supreme Court stated it was only 
using rational basis review in Plyler, it is widely acknowledged that the Court applied a 
heightened level of scrutiny.
218
  But this argument is premised on the assumption that the 
Supreme Court was granting heightened scrutiny to undocumented immigrants as a whole, and 
not merely applying it because the challenge involved children.
219
 The Court’s focus on the 
vulnerability of the children in particular may indicate that the holding is very narrow. If the 
holding is narrow, the argument that the Court intended to apply heightened scrutiny to 
undocumented immigrants is weaker.  
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court ever rejects the application of strict scrutiny to 
nonimmigrants, intermediate scrutiny review would still be a preferable alternative to rational 
basis review. Indeed, the Supreme Court has applied heightened scrutiny to several other classes 
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that it deemed not “discrete and insular” enough to receive strict scrutiny, but that deserved 
slightly higher scrutiny that rational basis review.
220
  Therefore, it is possible the Supreme Court 
would chose to apply heightened scrutiny to nonimmigrants. The case for strict scrutiny review 
is still strong, however, and it is the preferable standard of review.   
C. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause 
Preemption arguments have shown up in several of the nonimmigrant challenges. Several 
commentators have supported the use of the supremacy clause as a method of striking down such 
laws.
221
  The argument is that the federal government occupies the immigration field in general, 
or at the very least, specific statutes on immigration regulating the work of nonimmigrants 
preempt state restrictions in the same area.  Graham spoke to this issue when it held that “[s]tate 
laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage 
conflict with these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal 
Government.”222  The Supreme Court therefore held that immigration is an area traditionally 
occupied by the federal government.
223
  
Most recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the federal government’s supremacy in 
the immigration field in Arizona v. U.S.
224
  The Court stated that “[t]he federal power to 
determine immigration policy is well settled.”225  The Court struck down several sections of an 
Arizona state law dealing with immigration.  The Supreme Court held that “The Federal 
Government has occupied the field of alien registration” and as such “filed preemption” 
prevented the states from interfering.
226
  The Court struck down other sections when the laws 
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were obstacles in the fulfillment of the purpose of Congress.
227
  Arizona stands as an affirmation 
of the overwhelming powers of Congress to control immigration law, and the limited ability of 
states to add addition restrictions on immigrants.  
The Circuit Courts that concluded rational basis review applied to states’ classifications 
based upon nonimmigrant status accepted the federal government’s power in the immigration 
field while arguing that federal law would not actually preempt the state laws.  In LeClerc, the 
Fifth Circuit dismissed the preemption argument, invoking both state police powers and arguing 
that there could be harmonious regulation by both the state and federal government.
228
  But as 
Arizona shows, the Supreme Court may be less inclined to allow states control in areas of 
immigration than certain circuit courts have been. The Second Circuit in Dandamudi reasoned 
that the federal government had control over the field of immigration, and preemption by federal 
immigration law might disallow even complementary state regulation.
229
  The court concluded 
that because the visas involved are permission from the federal government to work in a specific 
field, the INA would preempt state laws restricting nonimmigrants from working in that field.
230
 
The Supremacy Clause may not be the best way to eliminate states’ classifications on the 
basis of nonimmigrant status, however, as preemption challenges do not necessarily resolve 
whether all state classifications on the basis of nonimmigrant status are constitutional.  For 
example, some of the laws challenged in the Circuit Court cases addressed state laws that 
restricted job licenses, which the work visa provisions in the INA might preempt; but another 
involved drivers’ licenses, which might fall outside the federal government’s immigrations 
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powers and more within the state’s powers.  Additionally, the court in Dandamudi did not strike 
down the New York license restriction on preemption grounds because some of the plaintiffs had 
TN visas, which precluded that argument.
231
  Therefore, while preemption arguments are 
important in resolving state authority to regulate nonimmigrants, they are not dispositive.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants using strict scrutiny 
review.  LPRs and nonimmigrants should receive the same treatment under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Nonimmigrants have come to the United States legally for a specified purpose, such as 
to continue their studies or work in a specific field.  Many stay for a long period of time before 
becoming lawful permanent residents, and eventually citizens.  Yet, in several circuits 
nonimmigrants do not receive the same protection under the law as LPRs.  But they should; 
nonimmigrants are as deserving of the protection that strict scrutiny review affords.  
Nonimmigrants are a suspect class because they fit into the category of a “discrete and insular 
minority”. They face many of the same problems as LPRs and are just as politically powerless, if 
not more so.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never explicitly granted them a lesser status 
than LPRs and has implied that they deserve the same levels of protection.  The Court’s holding 
in Graham applies to alienage as a whole, not merely to LPRs.  Therefore, any law 
discriminating against nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
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